14 Ağustos 2012 Salı

HOW NOT TO DESIGNATE A REVOCABLE TRUST AS AN INSURANCE POLICY BENEFICIARY

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In a recent Florida case that likely has relevance to other states, a decedent established a revocable trust for the benefit of his heirs. The trust had typical language that directed that the after the death of the settlor, the trust should be used to pay death obligations of the decedent and his estate. After such payment, the remaining trust proceeds would be used to fund residuary trusts for the decedent’s children.

The decedent named the revocable trust as beneficiary of two life insurance policies on his life. Due to financial reversals during his lifetime, at the time of his death the insurance proceeds were needed by his estate to pay the decedent’s death obligations, and thus would not pass to the trusts for the children.

The decedent’s personal representative and the trustee of his revocable trust (who was the same individual) asserted that Fla.Stats. §222.13(1) exempted the insurance proceeds from the claims of the decedent’s creditors.  Fla.Stats. §222.13(1) reads:

Whenever any person residing in the state shall die leaving insurance on his or her life, the said insurance shall inure exclusively to the benefit of the person for whose use and benefit such insurance is designated in the policy, and the proceeds thereof shall be exempt from the claims of creditors of the insured unless the insurance policy or a valid assignment thereof provides otherwise.

The decedent’s creditors claimed that Fla.Stats. §222.13(1) didn’t apply to protect the insurance benefits because the proceeds were payable to the revocable trust, and the revocable trust expressly provided for the payment of the decedent’s death obligations. The trial court agreed with the creditors, and on appeal, the appellate court concurred.

The court noted that a payment of insurance proceeds to a trust does not void the statutory exemption under Fla.Stats. §222.13(1). However, Fla.Stats. §733808(1) makes it clear that life insurance payable to a trust “shall be held and disposed of by the trustee in accordance with the terms of the trust as they appear in writing on the date of the death of the insured.” Since the terms of the trust directed payment of the decedent’s death obligations, then those terms would be given effect. Pursuant to the court’s reference in footnote 4 to  Fla.Stats. §733.808(4) which addresses payments to a revocable trust and the statutory direction for the payment of death obligations from a revocable trust, the court did not appear to believe that provision changed the analysis.

The case is relevant since oftentimes insurance, annuities, and other plan assets designate a trust to be established under a will or trust at the death of a decedent as the beneficiary. This allows the proceeds to pass into trust for the beneficiary and not outright to him or her, without the establishment of a separate trust for that purpose. Clearly, as this case confirms, a designation directly to the revocable trust which bears death obligation payment provisions will open such payments up to estate creditors.

While not addressed by the court, the better course of action would have been beneficiary designations directly to the testamentary subtrusts established under the revocable trust agreement, and not the revocable trust itself. Such subtrusts will usually themselves not be subject to the reach of the reimbursement obligation to the decedent’s estate as to assets flowing into them from assets situated outside of the revocable trust. Nonetheless, an express provision to that effect in the trust agreement  (i.e., that testamentary funding of a subtrust from insurance proceeds or other beneficiary designations is not intended to subject the funding assets to the  death obligation payment provisions of the revocable trust) would be helpful to avoid the interpretative issue whether it is intended that such fundings are subject to the death obligation payment provisions. Presumably, the statutory death obligation payment provisions (which exist outside of the payment provisions which are in the trust) will likely not be operable against such proceeds either, per the provisions of Fla.Stats. §733.808(4) which reads that a beneficiary designation to a trust “shall not be subject to any obligation to pay the expenses of the administration and obligations of the decedent’s estate or for contribution required from a trust under s. 733.607(2) to any greater extent than if the proceeds were payable directly to the beneficiaries named in the trust.”

While the above analysis does turn in part on Florida statutory law, it was the combination of the payment of the insurance proceeds directly to the revocable trust (and not a testamentary subtrust) and the express payment language in that trust, that created the problem. Therefore, the concept of choosing the right trust as beneficiary likewise should also have application in other states where the proceeds of life insurance payable directly to a beneficiary are not subject to the claims of a decedent’s creditor.

As an aside, the trial court and appellate court also turned down an attempt to reform the the trust to not have the death obligation payment provisions apply to the insurance, citing a lack of proof of intent that this is what the settlor intended.

Morey v. Everbank, 2012 WL 3000608 (1st DCA July 24, 2012)

NONBUSINESS VS. BUSINESS BAD DEBT

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Individuals who are stockholders or employees of a corporation often lend it funds. When the loan turns sour and does not get repaid, a "business" bad debt deduction, if allowed, allows for an ordinary loss. However, if the loan is a "nonbusiness" bad debt, the lender only receives short-term capital loss treatment. Further, for nonbusiness bad debts, a deduction is allowed only if the debt is wholly worthless - business bad debts are allowed for partial worthlessness.

If the lender is an employee of the corporation and that employment is the lender's primary employment, the taxpayer can often make a reasonable showing that he or she made the loan to protect his trade or business as an employee (and not just as an investment). In that situation, business bad debt treatment should be available. That is, if the lender believed the corporation needed the loan to keep the lender's job going, that should be enough.

Problems arise when the lender's motivation relates more to the investment side of things, and not protection of his or her employment. This tends to come up more when the lender is both an employee and a stockholder. As such a lender in a recent Tax Court case learned, this opens the door to a strong argument that the loan was made more to protect the lender's investment in the company than his or her employment. There, the taxpayer lost his bid for business bad debt treatment. In finding that the loan was a nonbusiness bad debt instead, it noted:

[T]he dominant motivation for making the loans was not petitioner's trade or business as an employee of the companies. ... Petitioner designed the software used by the companies and invested a significant amount of time and money to ensure the success of the companies. Protection of petitioner's investment interests in the companies, rather than protection of his salary, was the dominant motivation for the loans.

What was especially problematic for the taxpayer was that in the year after the loan was made, the lender did not receive any pay from the two companies involved. While not explicitly discussed, the Court's mentioning of this fact presumably helped it reach the conclusion that the loan was not made principally for employment purposes. Whether it would have ruled for the taxpayer if the lender continued to receive compensation is unknown.

Harry R. Haury, TC Memo 2012-215

IT IS OKAY TO MAKE A CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTION TO AN LLC WHOLLY OWNED BY A §501(C)(3) ORGANIZATION, IF YOU WERE WORRIED ABOUT THAT

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In 1997, the IRS issued final regulations providing that a domestic LLC wholly owned by single owner could be disregarded as a entity separate from its owner and its operations treated as a branch of its owner.  Consistent with those rules, in Announcement 99-102, the IRS provided that an owner that is exempt from taxation under Code §501(a) must include, as its own, information pertaining to the finances and operations of a disregarded entity in its annual information return (Forms 990, 990-EZ, 990-T, and 990-PF).Well, it has only taken 15 years, but the IRS is now acknowledging in Notice 2012-52 that it will treat as a charitable contribution to a U.S. charity a contribution to a disregarded entity wholly owned by the U.S. charity.Notice 2012-52

LAST CHANCE PLANNING–SEMINAR ANNOUNCEMENT

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There are only four months left to implement gift giving before year end to take advantage of the $5.12 million unified credit, before it reverts to $1 million in 2013. Given the increasing interest in planning for such gifts, and a few requests, I am putting on a one-hour in-house presentation on basic and advanced planning techniques. Included topics will include the pros and cons of gift planning, basic gifting techniques, SLATs and other gift trusts, formula fundings, and discounting, with a special focus on planning to allow continued economic interests to a donor after gifting.

The free presentation will be of interest to accountants, attorneys, financial planners, clients, bank, brokerage & trust officers,  and other interested persons. CPE credit is available, and CLE credit is applied for.

The presentations will be held on successive Fridays, on September 7 and 14, at 8 a.m. in our offices.

Since we have run out of room at past presentations, I am making this seminar available for a few days first to the readers of this blog, before a more general announcement goes out – so if you are interested, I suggest you sign up as soon as reasonably convenient. Please call or email Susana at 561-998-7847 or sibanez@floridatax.com with your preferred date.

For a copy of our Full Announcement, go here.

DOMA MARRIAGE DEFINITION STRUCK DOWN BY ANOTHER LOWER COURT

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In June, I wrote about how a married same-sex couple was able to persuade a U.S. District Court in New York to strike down the definition of marriage as being only the legal union between a man and a woman. This definition is in Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). In the case of Windsor v. U.S., 109 AFTR 2d ¶ 2012-870 (DC N.Y. 6/6/2012), the court struck down the definition and allowed the estate tax marital deduction to apply to a same-sex married couple. You can read my initial analysis here.

A District Court in Connecticut has now also ruled against the federal definition. This case involved several same-sex married couples, and the issues involved included income tax savings by being able to file as a married couple, eligibility of a surviving spouse for Social Security Lump Sum Death benefits, eligibility under the Family Medical Leave Act, and Medicare Part B supplemental insurance availability.

Like Windsor, the DOMA provision was struck down based on failing the rational basis test under the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Unlike Windsor, the Connecticut Court undertook a lengthy analysis as to whether homosexuality is a “suspect class” under that Clause – however, it ultimately ruled that such a finding was unnecessary to strike down the marriage definition given its failure to pass the lower scrutiny rational basis test.

The Windsor case is under appeal to the Second Circuit, so more authoritative precedent (one way or the other) will likely come out of that case. Interestingly, the Connecticut case noted that there are at least 1,138 federal laws and regulations that are impacted by the federal definition of marriage.

 Pedersen, et al, v. Office of Personnel Management, et al, (DC CT 07/31/12) Civil Action No. 3:10-cv-1750.